Philosophers and Ethicists on Gossip

Continuing our interaction with those who could be considered "proponents" of gossip.

In 1994, the University Press of Kansas published a collection of essays entitled Good Gossip.¹ The contributors examined the philosophical dimensions of gossip from a variety of interesting perspectives. Some were very compatible with the biblical data we learned in chapter two of this project. For example, Laurence Thomas of Syracuse University argues, “gossip is tied conceptually to the motives behind the remarks being made. Given one motive, we have gossip, given another, we do not.”² Amen.

Many of the other essays, however, are aimed at rehabilitating the notion of gossip, presenting it as a morally good thing.³ In the lead-off essay, Aaron Ben-Ze’ev of the University of Haifa argues that gossip is “an intrinsically valuable activity”⁴ satisfying “the basic need to acquire information about the personal and intimate aspects of other people’s lives.”⁵

Ben-Ze’ev’s definition of gossip is not exceedingly broad. He distinguishes gossiping from the spreading of rumors and characterizes it as “nonmalicious.”⁶ For Ben-Ze’ev, to gossip is “to talk (or write) idly about other people, mostly about their personal or intimate affairs.”⁷ “Typical gossip is an idle, relaxing activity whose value lies in the activity itself and not the achievement of external ends.”⁸ Gossip is “verbal chewing gum.”⁹

Emrys Westacott of Alfred University would agree with Ben-Ze’ev. In his article, “The Ethics of Gossiping” published in The International Journal of Applied Philosophy, Westacott argues, “that once one starts to consider the utilitarian arguments for countenancing gossip, it becomes apparent that, by and large, there is far more to be said in its favour than there is to be said against.”¹⁰

Westacott also significantly delimitates acceptable gossip, ruling out lies, violations of personal rights, disregarding of someone’s legitimate claims, necessary warnings, directly harmful talk, etc.¹¹ And yet, even after these restrictions, there are still plenty of kinds of gossip left, and Westcaott, on utilitarian grounds, deems them good. There is more to be gained by gossiping than by refraining.

Some of the “benefits” Westacott sees in gossip make some sense. “Gossip improves our understanding of social reality.” “Gossip facilitates the operation of social institutions.” “Gossip counteracts secrecy.” “Gossip enforces social mores.” “Gossiping can foster intimacy between people.”¹² It seems to me, however, that each of these “benefits” might have an unexplored dark side that would vitiate any profit they might offer.

            Westacott’s list of immediate benefits is more audacious.

i) Schadenfreude: We often experience a degree of malicious pleasure in someone else’s failings or misfortunes. ii) Smugness: Discussing another person’s failings or misfortunes can produce a smug sense of self-satisfaction at one’s own comparative virtue, abilities, or wisdom. iii) A feeling of power: To know something detrimental to the reputation of another person gives one a sense of power, both over the person concerned and in relation to those who are not yet in the know. . . . iv) Titillation. Gossiping can be titillating because of the subject matter, which sometimes relates to such inherently interesting topics as sex, money, or power. . . . v) Catharsis: Gossip undoubtedly can have a cathartic function, providing a release for negative feelings such as anger, frustration, bitterness, envy, or resentment.¹³

            These are the benefits of gossip?! Westacott anticipates our objections by admitting that "these pleasures just described [are] ethically dubious according to conventional norms. . . . However, there is no obvious reason to view [them] in an unfavourable light. On the contrary, since those who enjoy these pleasures are likely to understand themselves and others better, they are also more likely to be sympathetic and valuable companions. . . . To refrain from [talking to people about people] is a form of moral neurosis."¹⁴ [UPDATE 12/20/14: There is a error in how I shortened this quotation. See the interaction in the comments for a clarification.] 

Really? Viewed from my Christian moorings, Westacott’s claims are bewildering. I will have to be content to be considered neurotic by him.

Ronald de Sousa of the University of Toronto goes even further. He characterizes gossip as not only good, but genuinely virtuous and “saintly.”¹⁵ He gets there by devaluing discretion.

La Rochefoucauld taught us that hypocrisy is the tribute that vice pays to virtue. But what is discretion but hypocrisy in the third person? Discretion is the tribute paid in return to vice by virtue. Consider: if your friends had nothing worth keeping secret, there would be no use for discretion. . . . What point would there be to discretion in Paradise? Without the thieves, the Good Samaritan would never have had his chance at memorable virtue. . . . If all truths became public, we would approach utopia.¹⁶

As the essay unfolds, de Sousa backtracks from that last claim, “Well, perhaps I exaggerate. . . . At any rate, it seems likely that a world in which all information were universally available would be preferable to a world where immense power resides in the control of secrets.”¹⁷

The prophet Isaiah pronounced, “Woe to those who call evil good and good evil, who put darkness for light and light for darkness, who put bitter for sweet and sweet for bitter. Woe to those who are wise in their own eyes and clever in their own sight” (Isa 5:20-21). The Bible teaches that covering over offenses promotes love (Prov 10:12, 17:9, 1 Pet 4:8). There will be a day when all secrets will be revealed, and it will be utopian, but in this present evil age, discretion is a loving and saintly virtue (Luke 12:2-3, Rev 20-22).

The concern de Sousa has about power is shared by many feminist philosophers. In Good Gossip, both Maryann Ayim and Louise Collins offer feminist arguments for gossip as a means of subverting masculine oppression.¹⁸

Ayim compares gossip to science as an investigative means of “inquiry used to elicit information or knowledge.”¹⁹ She believes that gossip is often effective at getting to truth and, historically, is also often the only means to get there for certain people, especially women. “It is because we know very well that gossip spills over into the topics of choice and equality that the patriarchy has good reason to worry about women’s gossip.”²⁰

Collins opines that most of the major “complaints commonly lodged against gossip . . . that it is malicious, that it is pointless, that its subject matter is trivial, that it addresses important subject matter in an inappropriate way . . . are rooted in a masculinist paradigm of ‘good’ discourse.”²¹ She offers, in its place, a feminist paradigm where gossip is a means of personal discovery and the changing of “self-understanding.”²² “If we manage through gossip to project ourselves onto another’s perspective, we may be able to see aspects of ourselves that we had denied from that external point.”²³

Feminism has brought to light again many truths that have been historically hidden. For example, feminism has emphasized the importance of relationships between and the equal worth of all people. It seems to me, however, that “masculinist” and “patriarchal” are often used by feminists as pseudonyms for “objective” and “authoritative.” The Bible cuts a middle way between the objectifying and subjectifying oppression of women on the one side and the throwing off of all restraint and authority on the other. Men have often abused their positions of authority and should be held to account, but that does not disestablish proper authority used rightly for the good of those under it. Some things are right, and some things are wrong; and calling something “masculinist” or “patriarchal” does not change that fact. Sinful gossip remains sinful.²⁴

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¹Robert F. Goodman and Aaron Ben-Ze’ev, eds., Good Gossip (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 1994).

²Laurence Thomas, “The Logic of Gossip,” in Good Gossip, ed. Robert F. Goodman and Aaron Ben-Ze’ev (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 1994), 54. The essay by Gabriele Taylor moves in similar directions and is generally compatible with biblical teaching. Gabriele Taylor, “Gossip as Moral Talk,” Good Gossip, ed. Robert F. Goodman and Aaron Ben-Ze’ev (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 1994), 34-46.

³A number of the essays are more neutral on the subject. The third part of Good Gossip is a series of empirical studies attempting to measure gossip in various ways. While not as objective as they claim to be, these chapters are fascinating reading. See Robert F. Goodman and Aaron Ben-Ze’ev, eds., Good Gossip (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 1994), 117-192.

⁴Aaron Ben-Ze’ev, “The Vindication of Gossip,” in Good Gossip, ed. Robert F. Goodman and Aaron Ben-Ze’ev (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 1994), 13.

⁵Ibid., 15.

⁶Ibid., 13-14.

⁷Ibid., 13.

⁸Aaron Ben-Ze’ev, “The Vindication of Gossip,” in Good Gossip, ed. Robert F. Goodman and Aaron Ben-Ze’ev (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 1994), 13.

⁹Ibid., 17.

¹⁰Emrys Westacott, “The Ethics of Gossiping,” The International Journal of Applied Philosophy 14, no. 1 (2000): 81.

¹¹Ibid., 67-72. Westacott provides a helpful diagram on page 73 as kind of flowchart entitled, “Eliminating the Morally Uncontroversial.”

¹²Ibid., 84-86. These are the headings in Westacott’s list of “Goods Promoted Indirectly by Gossip.”

¹³Emrys Westacott, “The Ethics of Gossiping,” The International Journal of Applied Philosophy 14, no. 1 (2000): 82. Westacott’s list continues with “vi) People are interesting,” “vii) Solving mysteries,” and “viii) Learning is enjoyable.” (ibid., 82-84).

¹⁴Ibid., 84.

¹⁵Ronald de Sousa, “In Praise of Gossip: Indiscretion as a Saintly Virtue,” in Good Gossip, ed. Robert F. Goodman and Aaron Ben-Ze’ev (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 1994), 25-33.

¹⁶Ibid., 31.

¹⁷Ibid., 32.

¹⁸Maryann Ayim, “Knowledge Through the Grapevine: Gossip as Inquiry,” in Good Gossip, ed. Robert F. Goodman and Aaron Ben-Ze’ev (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 1994), 85-99. Louise Collins, “Gossip: A Feminist Defense,” in Good Gossip, ed. Robert F. Goodman and Aaron Ben-Ze’ev (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 1994), 106-114. Ayim is from of the University of Western Ontario. In the list of contributors to Good Gossip, Collins is not associated with any particular school. Many of the other contributors to this anthology also seem to have a feminist bent.

¹⁹Maryann Ayim, “Knowledge Through the Grapevine: Gossip as Inquiry,” in Good Gossip, ed. Robert F. Goodman and Aaron Ben-Ze’ev (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 1994), 86.

²⁰Ibid., 98-99.

²¹Louise Collins, “Gossip: A Feminist Defense,” in Good Gossip, ed. Robert F. Goodman and Aaron Ben-Ze’ev (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 1994), 108.

²²Ibid., 114.

²³Louise Collins, “Gossip: A Feminist Defense,” in Good Gossip, ed. Robert F. Goodman and Aaron Ben-Ze’ev (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 1994), 114.

²⁴And yet, again, not everything labeled “gossip” is sinful. The Bible does have a category for the subversion of oppressors. Shiphrah and Puah, the Hebrew midwives, would probably have been branded as malicious gossips in their day, but were actually doing something quite righteous. To the degree that women are truly oppressed, the use of clandestine communication might be justified in serving righteous ends.